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The Mammoth Book of Secrets of the SAS & Elite Forces Page 5
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On the night before the main Task Force landing at San Carlos, the SAS mounted a sequence of diversionary raids. These included the landing of 60 men of D Squadron, who “yomped” for 20 hours to reach the hills north of Darwin to attack the garrison at Goose Green. Their intention was to simulate a battalion-sized (600 men) attack, and accordingly they rained down a torrent of LAWs, Milan missiles, GMPG rounds and tracer into the Argentinian positions. Such was the ferocity of the barrage that the enemy failed to probe the SAS positions and could only manage sporadic return fire. By mid-morning, the main landing accomplished, the SAS disengaged from Goose Green, marching north to meet 2 Para as they made their way inland. En route, the SAS were intercepted by a Pucara ground-attack aircraft. Fatalities seemed certain, but as the plane approached an SAS trooper launched an American Stinger missile. He scored a direct hit, the aircraft exploding into flames.
Over the next fortnight SAS patrols continued their recces and probing missions. At the end of May D Squadron seized Mount Kent, 40 miles behind enemy lines, and held it for several days until reinforced by 42 Commando Marines. This despite aggressive – and brave – patrolling from Argentine special forces, which resulted in a series of sharp nocturnal firefights. After their relief, D Squadron was in action again, with five teams landed on West Falkland. But the considerable enemy garrisons at Fox Bay and Port Howard responded vigorously and enjoyed excellent radio-direction-finding equipment. It was on West Falkland that Captain John Hamilton lost his life.
The other SAS patrols were more fortunate and escaped detection to call down regular barrages of naval gunfire. To its disappointment a patrol from B Squadron – which had recently joined the Task Force by way of parachute drop into the Atlantic – was tasked to ambush a reinforcement of the garrison at Fox Bay, but the enemy failed to turn up. By now it was becoming clear to all that the war was in its last days.
There remained one major SAS raid, which was mounted in East Falkland on the night of 13–14 June. To take the pressure off 2 Para, who were assaulting Wireless Ridge a few miles west of Port Stanley, the SAS volunteered to put in a raid to the enemy rear – from the sea. Two troops from D Squadron, one from G Squadron and six men from 3 SBS rode into Port Stanley harbour on high-speed Rigid Raiders with the aim of setting fire to the oil-storage tanks there. As troopers from the Regiment later conceded, the raid was more audacious than wise. The Argentinians opened up with every available weapon, including triple-barrelled 20 mm Rheinmetall anti-aircraft cannon depressed to their lowest trajectory. These spewed out a constant stream of glowing red metal which obliged the raiders to withdraw if they were not to suffer heavy losses.
The next morning, 14 June, it was all over. Their morale gone and their position hopeless, the Argentinians surrendered. British victory owed no small part to the men of 22 SAS. Fittingly, therefore, the surrender was effectively taken by the Commanding Officer of 22 SAS Mike Rose.
The campaign to liberate the Falklands brought fresh glories to the pages of Regimental history, but they had their price. A few days after the attack on Pebble Island a helicopter cross-decking members of D Squadron from HMS Hermes to HMS Intrepid hit something, probably a giant petrel, which got sucked into its air intake. The Sea King plummetted into the icy water with the loss of 20 SAS troopers and attached specialists, plus one of the aircrew. It was the heaviest loss the Regiment had suffered in a single day since the Second World War.
With the end of the campaign, the SAS returned home to Stirling Lines. As ever, the Regiment was shy of publicity, the men slipping back into barracks without fanfare or applauding crowds. None returned more secretly than the SAS teams who had been sent to operate on the Argentinian mainland, primarily to provide early warning of enemy aircraft taking off, although a large-scale raid of the Rio Gallegos airfield was set in motion but aborted at the last minute. The only real evidence of these clandestine operations is a burnt-out Sea King helicopter from a squadron attached to the Task Force which was discovered on the shores of southern Chile. Some secrets may never be told.
C7
In 2001 the SAS dropped use of the M16 rifle (see p44) in favour of the Canadian C7. The Regiment had tested the C7 for two years and been extremely impressed by its reliability and firepower. These qualities offset the high price tag of the C7: £5500 a piece.
As adapted for use by the special forces, the C7 is a complete weapons system, having laser targetting, a grenade launcher, and sniper/semi/-automatic/full-automatic firing models. It is this weapon that the SAS took into Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Specification (C7 Special Forces Weapon)
Cartridge: 5.56 × 45 mm NATO; Weight (complete with optical sight and 30rd magazine) 4.4 kg; Length (stock fully retracted) 80 cm; Magazine: 30 or 100 round; Effective rage 800m
Assessment
Reliability *****; Accuracy ***; Worldwide users ***.
WAR OF THE SHADOWS: 22 SAS IN BOSNIA
Away down the mountain, through the myriad fir trees, Sarajevo lay still in the night. There were few lights. Sarajevo had long ceased to function as a modern city. The capital of Muslim Bosnia was ringed by mountains – and the mountains were held by the Serbs and their artillery.
It was approaching 0100 hours on 30 August 1995. For 40 months the Serbs had been shelling Sarajevo, causing over 10,000 civilians to be killed. Although the UN peacekeeping force had ordered a ‘warning’ airstrike against the Serbs in May, this had been haughtily ignored; as a reply the Serbs had taken 400 UN peacekeepers hostage. Elsewhere in Bosnia, the Serb Army of General Ratko Mladic, had ‘ethnically cleansed’ vast areas of their Muslims. No-one doubted that the same genocidal fate awaited Sarajevo should it fall.
But Sarajevo would not fall. The UN had decided at last to take resolute action, and, on the Serbs’ ignoring of a final order to withdraw from the city, determined to wield the big stick. Not the least proof of this was that, in those first minutes of 30 August, members of 22 SAS were stealing through the darkness towards Serb positions. Their task was to identify Serb artillery, mortars, communications equipment and anti-aircraft guns and then guide in an airstrike of NATO planes from bases in Italy. To this end, the SAS patrols were equipped with lightweight laser target designators to ‘light up’ targets for laser-guided bombs (see box).
The Serb positions were well-known to the SAS, which had been deployed in Bosnia since March 1994, called in at the behest of the commander of the local UN forces, Major-General Mike Rose – who happened to be the ex-Commandant of 22 SAS. Rose needed the identification and mapping of all the protagonists positions, and accordingly tasked 22 SAS and the French Foreign Legion. Some of the identification was achieved overtly, some of it covertly, with SAS four-man patrols going deep behind Serb lines. For lengthy watches of Serb bunkers and trenches, camouflaged Observation Posts were built. The job was not without its dangers. A seven-man SAS patrol became trapped by Serb shelling in Gorazde in April 1994, with one member, Corporal Rennie, later dying of head wounds.
This one setback aside, SAS reconnaissance had been characteristically successful. Thus it was that by 0100 on 30 August 1995, SAS patrols had located all their Serb targets and checked them with Thermal Images (a neat, eyes-in the-dark, hand-held device, that detects heat patterns). At exactly 0100, SAS patrols and Forward Air Controls directed in the first airstrikes and explosions lit up the night, the sound of the detonations booming around the mountains. First to be hit were Serb anti-aircraft batteries and communications centres. As the Nato pilots neared the targets they made radio contact with SAS soldiers on the ground, who then flicked on their Pilkington LF25 laser designators to ‘illuminate’ Serb weapons. A ‘path of light’ then guided the planes’ 1000 lb Paveway bombs right-on target. As the initial wave of NATO aircraft departed, the SAS directed the second wave on to Serb artillery and mortar positions. For nearly two and a half hours, the SAS directed the air bombardment before ‘bugging out’ in the first rays of dawn. The raids continued until
0950, by which time French and British guns on Mount Igman had joined the anti-Serbian dawn chorus. In all, 90 Serb targets were hit, not only at Sarajevo but at Pale, Gorazde and Tuzla.
Even so, the Serbs stuck to their gun positions. For the next month, SAS patrols and Forward Air Controllers repeatedly reconnoitred and ‘lit up’ Serb targets, helping to drop no less than 1000 bombs. By the beginning of September, the Serbs began to withdraw their heavy guns. The SAS had played a indispensable part in the salvation of Sarajevo.
PILKINGTON LF25 LASER TARGET DESIGNATOR
The LF25 is a literal box of tricks. Encased in metal, it fires a powerful laser beam which illuminates a target up to 10 km away. The laser radiation reflected off the target is picked up by a ‘seeker’ in a Laser-Guided Bomb, which is accordingly directed by its on-board computer to the target. For the LGB to hit home, the designator must remain switched on throughout the attack. For stability and accuracy, the laser target designator is tripod mounted.
Laser Target Designators were first used by 22 SAS in the Falklands and Gulf Wars, but really came into their own in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Their advantages are obvious. To destroy an enemy target, the SAS no longer have to carry around pounds of explosives but can simply call up a hi-tec airstrike. Moreover, the sheer operational distance of the Laser Target Designator means that SAS soldiers do not have to present themselves as targets to the opposing force.
Specification
Range: 3000–9000 m
Weight: 6 Kg
Chapter 2
AMERICAN ARMY SPECIAL FORCES
THE GREEN BERETS
The US Army’s Special Forces originated in the early 1950s and established a base at Fort Bragg, South Carolina, site of the Army Special Warfare School. America has a rich history of operations by unconventional forces, dating back to the French and Indian wars in the days when the 13 colonies were still British and including Rogers’ Rangers who were active during the War of Independence.
A vast conglomeration of special operations units grew like mushrooms during World War II, but they were quickly disbanded after the war. Interest was revived in the 1950s following the Korean War, and that led to the formation of the Special Forces.
At the time they were kept at low strengths. They were only grudgingly tolerated by the traditionalist in the army’s high command, who did not like any unit with pretensions to elite status. Army administrators discouraged officers who wanted to spend more than one tour with the Special Forces, on the basis that they would lose experience in their basic branch, and thus be unfavourably looked on at promotion time.
With the inauguration of President John F Kennedy in 1961 the fate of the Special Forces changed. Kennedy strongly believed that such units were the best way to counter communist “wars of liberation”. As it became chic in Washington to support the “Green Berets”, so named because of their distinctive headgear which had been approved by the President, their numbers increased by several orders of magnitude.
The original Special Forces mission was to organise guerilla warfare in enemy-held countries. That role changed as more and more Green Berets were sent to South East Asia, where they became increasingly involved in counter-insurgency operations.
The Special Forces were among the first Americans in action in Vietnam: the 5th Special Forces Group took over the CIA’s border surveillance programme, teaching the fundamentals of reconnaissance and local defence to remote tribes in Laos and the Vietnamese highlands. Operating in small teams with large numbers of native auxiliaries, often only marginally less hostile to the government in Saigon than to the communists, they ran patrols from border camps to uncover communist infiltration on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
In more settled parts of Vietnam the Green Berets were assigned as advisors by the US military authorities, to provide anything from advice on personal health and drainage to teaching unarmed combat and demolitions to members of the Civilian Irregular Defence Groups.
Following the end of the war in South East Asia, the Green Berets suffered under the general malaise which afflicted the US armed forces but the low intensity conflict that now prevails worldwide ensured that they would not be disbanded. In 1987 Special Forces were made a separate branch of the army, and their orders now come via the US Special Operations Command, which incorporates all special operations units from all US services.
Today’s Green Berets retain their training function: Special Forces teams can be found passing on their skills to special operations units around the world. Most recently, they have been organising South American and South East Asian units as part of the US government’s worldwide anti drugs campaign.
Training and guerilla warfare is not the whole story, of course. Delta Force, the US Army’s hostage rescue unit, is part of the Special Forces. Special Forces also have major roles in conventional high-intensity conflict. During the Gulf War, Special Forces reconnaissance teams penetrated deep into Iraq, keeping watch on Iraqi troop movements, hunting “Scud” launching sites, laser-designating targets for coalition air power, and scouting out routes for the coalition’s ground offensive. Along with their counterparts in other services and from other armies, the Green Berets played a vital part in the eventual success of the anti-Saddam coalition.
EYEWITNESS: With the Green Berets in Vietnam
George Perkins was an enlisted Combat Air Controller in the US Air Force who served with a Special Forces team during the early days of the Vietnam War.
“From the time ‘advisers’ first went to Vietnam in 1961 until the American withdrawal in 1973, a small band of US Air Force men had the difficult task of directing close air support. The airmen spent much of their time on the ground and faced as much danger as infantrymen.
“In those days, they didn’t have time for fancy training to make you a Combat Air Controller. They just stuck you in the bushes, slung a radio over your back and told you to do the job. The job, of course, involved directing aircraft in attacks against ground targets. Prior to that time it had always been customary for the Air Force to have its own men on the ground – right there with the footslogging GIs – to direct close air support.
“In 1961, I was one of three dozen NCOs selected to become Air Commandos, our service’s answer to the Green Berets – another ‘elite’ unit personally backed by President Kennedy. In the tidal marshlands at Eglin Air Force Base near Fort Walton Beach on the west Florida coast we were training for a war most Americans hadn’t yet heard about.
“I stepped off a C-124 at Saigon’s Tan Son Nhut Airport on 21 October 1962 along with a dozen other guys from the original Air Commando contingent. We wore ANZAC campaign headgear – Australian hats with turned up brims which were to become the Air Commando symbol. We were a close-knit group. On the day of my arrival, the guys were talking about how the Viet Cong had shot down one of our number. Major Al Saunders. Luckily he’d been rescued under heavy fire. Al had been piloting a T-28, the primitive fighter-bomber we were teaching the Vietnamese to fly.
“I was sent down to the Delta to a Special Forces ‘B’ Camp run by 34-year-old Major Ernest Trevor from Columbus, Georgia. Trevor was a gung-ho Green Beret. He liked us Air Force guys but doubted we’d be much use to him. He was wrong.
“On 1 November 1962, South Vietnamese troopers under Trevor’s tutelage were ambushed by a surprisingly heavy Viet Cong force. They were pinned down in a deserted hamlet by withering fire from a high, thickly-vegetated slope. Men were getting killed all around us. Mortar shells careened into our midst, coughing up clods of earth and spraying shrapnel. Bursts of automatic gunfire whipped over my head as I snake-crawled towards the spot where Major Trevor and Captain Andy Stock-well were assessing the situation.
“I got on the radio. A flight of T-28s was in the area, ready to help out.
“Do your stuff”, Stockwell urged, a little sarcastically. “Get those 28s in here and plaster the Cong.”
“That’s what I’m here for, sir. But it isn’t that simple.”
> “Huh?”
“We have to pinpoint the VC. All I see is muzzle flashes.”
“I got on the radio and confirmed with the T-28 flight leader that he was carrying napalm and rockets. He was using the callsign ‘Straight Flush’, and I recognized the voice of Captain John R Watkins, the ‘wild man’ of our Air Commando outfit. Watkins was supposedly ‘advising’ the South Vietnamese who piloted the three other T-28s, but that was sheer fiction. He was in command.
“I learned that Watkins had sufficient fuel, and I instructed him to wait a mile south of the battle zone. I rounded up two of Trevor’s Vietnamese troops and we began hacking our way uphill from the hamlet, slicing through the brush with machetes. It was sheer hell, lugging that PRC-10 radio and a Colt-Armalite rifle – the weapon developed by the Air Force which would later become the standard M16. Then we literally walked into three stray Cong. They were spindly little men in black garb, lugging carbines. Less than three metres apart, we exchanged gunfire. I killed two, one of my men got the third. My other man, Corporal Diem was hit in the shoulder and thigh and was bleeding profusely.
“Damn!” I thought aloud. “We’ve got to get closer.”
The AR-15 was one of the first of the modern 5.56-mm calibre rifles to enter service. Designed by Eugene Stoner in the late 1950s, the AR-15 made extensive use of pressed steel and plastic in its construction. Although it looked like a toy, it was a serious weapon. Firing high-velocity 5.56-mm ammunition, much smaller than the then standard 7.62-mm NATO round, it allowed soldiers to carry more ammunition into combat. It was designated M16 when issued to the US Air Force, and was to go on to achieve fame as the US Army’s standard rifle in Vietnam. After initial reliability problems the M16 proved to be an effective battlefield weapon, and the current M16A2 variant is much improved.